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DIRECTED TAX HOLIDAYS: ECONOMIC
STIMULUS OR CORPORATE DREAM?
DAKOTA NEWTON
ABSTRACT
U.S. corporations currently have more than $2.4 trillion
stashed in the accounts of their overseas subsidiaries—a sum that
costs the domestic economy billions of dollars every year. A directed
tax holiday is one potential method of inducing repatriation of
those funds and stimulating the domestic economy. Although a
previous tax holiday failed to meet expectations, current proposals
from the public and private sectors suggest that a directed tax
holiday could fund much-needed infrastructure investment. A review
and economic analysis of these proposals shows that a directed
tax holiday that channels revenue into expanding and updating
infrastructure will greatly benefit the domestic economy.

Juris Doctor Candidate, William & Mary Law School Class of 2018.
Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from Brigham Young University
Class of 2015. The author would like to thank his long-suffering wife for
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INTRODUCTION
In April 2016, Oxfam America released a report revealing
that the top fifty U.S. corporations are holding more than $1.4
trillion in offshore cash.1 While the dollar figure was not particularly surprising—U.S. corporations have held large sums of cash
offshore for decades—the report also claimed that the U.S. government is missing out on $130 billion annually as a result of
corporate offshoring practices.2 Just a month later, the German
newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung released a 2.6 terabyte data leak
comprising roughly 11.5 million documents regarding billions of
dollars that Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca assisted
clients to hide in tax havens.3 Since that time, intense mainstream media focus has brought the public’s attention to the facts
that economists and accountants have known for years—American
corporations hoard cash offshore to avoid paying domestic taxes.4
A Citizen’s for Tax Justice report from March 2016 pegged the
total amount held offshore by U.S. corporations at $2.4 trillion,5
a number equivalent to France’s 2015 GDP.6
Just as the world economy would suffer if the French economy ceased to exist, so does the American domestic economy when
corporations hoard funds offshore.7 Simply put, $2.4 trillion held
offshore is a missed opportunity for domestic investment.8 There
1 OXFAM AMERICA, BROKEN AT THE TOP: HOW AMERICA’S DYSFUNCTIONAL
TAX SYSTEM COSTS BILLIONS IN CORPORATE TAX DODGING 1–2 (Apr. 14, 2016).
2 Id. at 2.
3 Frederik Obermaier et al., About the Panama Papers, SÜDDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG 1, 3 (2016), http://panamapapers.sueddeutsche.de/articles/56febff0a1
bb8d3c3495adf4/.
4 CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES HOLD A RECORD $2.4
TRILLION OFFSHORE 1 (Mar. 3, 2016), https://ctj.org/pdf/pre0316.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GQU9-MXEC].
5 Id.; OXFAM AMERICA, supra note 1, at 8; Jeff Sommer, A Stranded $2
Trillion Overseas Stash Gets Closer to Coming Home, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/06/your-money/strategies-corporate
-cash-repatriation-bipartisan-consensuss.html?_r=0 (discussing potential domestic revenue from a repatriation event).
6 WORLD BANK, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2015 1 (Oct. 11, 2016), https://
web.archive.org/web/20161010225636/http://databank.worldbank.org/data/down
load/GDP.pdf.
7 See, e.g., CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 1, 4.
8 See Sommer, supra note 5, at 2.
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are numerous proposals for how to return these funds to the
United States, all of which have benefits and flaws.9 In this Note, I
examine the merits of a directed tax holiday10 as a repatriation
method. I review past attempts at a tax holiday and analyze existing and recent tax holiday proposals. Using projected figures
and historic returns on investment, I conclude that a directed
tax holiday will stimulate the U.S. economy by creating new jobs,
reviving crumbling infrastructure, and prompting investment in
green technology.
In Part I, I briefly review the U.S. corporate tax system for
foreign earnings and explain why corporations have so much money
stored overseas. In Part II, I review the American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004 and discuss its shortcomings. In Part III, I discuss
pending legislation in Congress, proposals from the 2016 Presidential candidates, and proposals from industry analysts. In Part
IV, I examine the projected positive externalities that a directed tax
holiday will bring. In Part V, I examine and rebut some of the
negative externalities associated with tax holidays. I conclude that a
directed tax holiday would greatly benefit the U.S. economy.
I. HOW DID $2.4 TRILLION END UP OVERSEAS?
Before discussing how to bring $2.4 trillion back to the
United States, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss how such a huge
sum of money ended up overseas.
American corporations pay a 35 percent effective rate on
their earnings, the highest rate in the developed world.11 The
United States employs a residence-based tax system, meaning
that American corporations are taxed on all of their income,
CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 4.
I make a somewhat artificial distinction in this Note between a “tax holiday” and a “directed tax holiday.” I define a “directed tax holiday” as a tax
holiday that requires certain corporate investments for repatriated funds and
earmarks federal revenues for a designated purpose. A “tax holiday” is merely
a time period during which participating entities pay a reduced tax rate.
11 DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40178,
TAX CUTS ON REPATRIATION EARNINGS AS ECONOMIC STIMULUS: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 2 (2011). U.S. corporations pay taxes on their overseas earnings to the
governments of the various countries that they do business in. When U.S. corporations bring their overseas funds back to the U.S., they pay the statutory rate of
35 percent minus a tax credit equal to the taxes paid to foreign governments.
9

10
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regardless of where it is earned, but foreign corporations are
only taxed on income earned in the United States.12 Accordingly,
U.S. corporations that operate overseas through a foreign subsidiary can avoid paying U.S. taxes indefinitely so long as the
foreign subsidiary retains control over the earnings and reinvests those earnings abroad.13 The U.S. firm only pays taxes on
its foreign earnings when the money is repatriated into the U.S.
as an intra-firm dividend or other form of income.14 This system
gives corporations significant incentives to keep their money
abroad, preferably in a tax haven.15
A. How Corporations Avoid Paying Taxes
American corporations use a number of complex methods
to avoid paying U.S. taxes on foreign earnings.16 The practice of
keeping cash overseas to avoid the repatriation tax is known as
“profit-shifting.”17 Earnings stripping is another common method
used to escape U.S. tax liability.18 Rather than describing these
in detail, I would like to highlight the important effects of these
entirely legal, but ethically questionable, practices.19 Thus, while
Id. at 1.
Id. at 1–2.
14 Id. at 2.
15 Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory
Competition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1665, 1716 (2015).
16 For a primer on how this works at the company level, see Walter Hickey,
Apple Avoids Paying $17 Million In Taxes Every Day Through A Ballsy But
Genius Tax Avoidance Scheme, BUS. INSIDER (May 21, 2013, 4:16 PM), http:
//www.businessinsider.com/how-apple-reduces-what-it-pays-in-taxes-2013-5
[https:// perma.cc/D2HY-YGBS] (detailing Apple, Inc.’s complex organizational
scheme to minimize tax liability).
17 Rob Davies, U.S. corporations have $1.4tn hidden in tax havens, claims
Oxfam report, GUARDIAN (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world
/2016/apr/14/us-corporations-14-trillion-hidden-tax-havens-oxfam [https://perma
.cc/XMZ5-TAZJ].
18 John C. Hamlett, The Declining Allure of Being “American” and the Proliferation of Corporate Tax Inversions: A Critical Analysis of Regulatory Efforts to
Curtail the Inversion Trend, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 767, 775 n.78, 776 n.81 (2016).
19 See Nelson D. Schwartz & Charles Duhigg, Apple’s Web of Tax Shelters
Saved It Billions, Panel Finds, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2013), http://www.ny
times.com/2013/05/21/business/apple-avoided-billions-in-taxes-congressional
-panel-says.html?pagewanted=all.
12

13
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U.S. corporations are accused of using accounting “gimmicks” to
avoid paying U.S. taxes,20 and are certainly avoiding the spirit of
the law of taxation, there is no law enforcement mechanism currently available to the Federal government.21
B. Losses Associated with Offshoring Practices
Offshoring practices, while legal, are harmful to the American economy in several ways.22 First, offshoring deprives the
American economy of domestic investment, and, second, it deprives the Federal government of significant tax revenues.23
Ernst & Young estimates that the U.S. economy benefitted
from $165 billion worth of private capital investment in 2015.24
Approximately 22 percent of that came from foreign sources, so
U.S. firms invested nearly $128 billion in capital improvements
in 2015.25 This figure is roughly consistent with previous years.26
The $2.4 trillion held overseas by U.S. firms, therefore, represents almost nineteen years of domestic capital investment.27
In addition to lost domestic investment opportunities, offshoring also significantly reduces Federal tax revenues.28 Tax
policy activist group Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ) estimated
Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple Inc.):
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 14 (2013) (testimony
of Apple Inc.).
21 Id. at 10, 16. This fact becomes important later when balancing utilities
for repatriation proposals. See generally Nigel Green, In defence of ‘Tax Havens’: offshore banking is not the same as dodgy dealing, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13,
2016, 10:29 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/13/off
shore-panama-papers-murky-investors [https://perma.cc/W5NL-SHBE] (discussing the legality of using offshore financial centers).
22 See Schwartz & Duhigg, supra note 19, at 2.
23 See Davies, supra note 17, at 2.
24 ERNST & YOUNG LLP, 2016 US INVESTMENT MONITOR TRACKING MOBILE
CAPITAL INVESTMENTS DURING 2015, at 17 (2016), http://www.ey.com/Publica
tion/vwLUAssets/ey-2016-us-investment-monitor/$FILE/ey-2016-us-investment
-monitor.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQW2-H5LA].
25 Id. at 9.
26 Id. at 23–25.
27 Id. at 23.
28 CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 3.
20
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that the $2.4 trillion held offshore is depriving the U.S. government
of nearly $700 billion in tax revenue.29 Economist Kimberly
Clausing believes that the CTJ estimate is conservative and puts
the lost tax revenue figure closer to $800 billion.30 Importantly,
Clausing also estimates that corporate offshoring practices cost
the Federal government some $94 billion annually, a figure that
will only continue to rise in coming years.31
The losses associated with offshoring suggest that action
of some sort is necessary. While a comprehensive reform of the
U.S. tax system would be welcome, such action is unlikely to
occur soon.32 Thus, smaller actions appear to be the most feasible
path forward for the near future. This brings us to the question
of whether a directed tax holiday is a meritorious option.
II. THE AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004
The idea of a tax holiday is nothing new. It has been discussed, studied, and even attempted in 2004 to disastrous effect.33
A. The American Jobs Creation Act
Back in 2003, following the dot com bubble and subsequent
recession, U.S. corporations held an estimated $650 billion overseas.34 In the interest of bringing those funds back to the United
Id.
Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax
Base in the United States and Beyond, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 905, 923–24 (2016).
31 Id. at 21.
32 See generally MILLER & CHEVALIER CHARTERED, NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE
COUNCIL, 2016 TAX POLICY FORECAST SURVEY (2016), https://www.miller
chevalier.com/sites/default/files/resources/2016-Tax-Policy-Forecast-Survey-Full
-Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/GF3U-8FK7] (discussing recent attempts at comprehensive reform and the likelihood of comprehensive reform in 2017 and 2018).
33 Chuck Marr & Chye-Ching Huang, Repatriation Tax Holiday Would Lose
Revenue And Is a Proven Policy Failure, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES
(June 19, 2014), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/6-19-14tax
.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZX26-QRFQ].
34 Bob Bryan, US companies are ‘hoarding’ a record $2.5 trillion in cash
overseas, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 19, 2016, 11:15 AM), http://www.businessinsider
.com/us-companies-hoarding-25-trillion-of-cash-overseas-2016-9 [http://perma
.cc/A33G-93UP].
29

30
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States, Congress approved an amendment to I.R.C. § 965(f), which
allowed a temporary, undirected tax holiday.35 The American
Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) permitted, inter alia, a temporary tax
holiday from October 22, 2004 to October 22, 2006 during which
U.S. corporations paid an effective rate of 5.25 percent on repatriated cash.36 Participating corporations were required to have
an approved reinvestment plan for repatriated funds before receiving the reduced rate.37 According to the AJCA, the reinvestment
plan could not provide for executive compensation, but could be
used in the United States “as a source for the funding of worker
hiring and training, infrastructure, research and development,
capital investments, or the financial stabilization of the corporation for the purposes of job retention or creation.”38 Notably,
there was no incremental investment requirement obligating
participating corporations to demonstrate that the amount spent
under the reinvestment plan was greater than either the average amount spent in previous years or the amount budgeted
before receiving the dividend.39 Essentially, the Federal government relied on corporations to act in the spirit of the law,
knowing that there was no serious enforcement mechanism to
prevent corporations from taking advantage of the vagueness of
the law.40 The stated purpose of the AJCA was to provide economic stimulus in the United States and create new jobs.41
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 422, 118
Stat. 1418, 1514–19 (2004). Section 422 of the AJCA is officially titled the
Homeland Investment Act (HIA), but as the existing literature rarely distinguishes between the AJCA and the HIA, I will continue that trend. Unlike
the directed tax holiday that I discuss, revenues from the AJCA were not
funneled directly into a single agency or Department budget.
36 Id. The AJCA accomplished this by giving repatriating corporations a
“deduction equal to 85 percent of the increase in foreign-source earnings
repatriated.” MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 11, at 2.
37 MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 11, at 5.
38 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 422(a), 118
Stat. 1418, 1516 (2004).
39 M. Mendel Pinson, Effects of 2004 Int’l Tax Holiday, Recommendations
Going Forward, 132 TAX NOTES 845, 852 (2011).
40 See id.
41 Id.
35
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B. The Effect and Shortcomings of the AJCA
The AJCA did not go according to plan.42 Congressional representatives anticipated that repatriating corporations would bring
$400 billion back into the domestic economy, creating more than
600,000 jobs and reducing the deficit by $163 billion.43 Although the
ACJA holiday generated some $16.4 billion in revenue for the U.S.
Treasury,44 it did not create nearly as many jobs as anticipated.45
Corporations brought back about $362 billion of the more
than $600 billion held overseas; $312 billion of which qualified for
5.25 percent rate.46 Unfortunately, most of the funds were not spent
on new jobs.47 Participating corporations increased share buybacks
by $60 billion more than non-participating firms—accounting for
roughly 20 percent of the total amount repatriated.48 There is also
no evidence that the AJCA created very many jobs.49 The Congressional Research Service found that many of the largest participating
Michelle Leder, The $104 Billion Refund: The most absurd corporate tax
giveaway of 2005, SLATE: MONEYBOX (Apr. 13, 2006, 12:33 PM), http://www
.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2006/04/the_104_billion_refund.html
[http://perma.cc/CB7D-UX3R].
43 This is according to House Ways and Means Committee member Phil
English, R-Pa., who drafted the bill. See Roy Clemons & Michael R. Kinney,
An Analysis of the Tax Holiday for Repatriation Under the Jobs Act, 52 TAX
NOTES 759, 760 (2008).
44 Matthew Jerome Mauntel, Stimulating the Stimulus: U.S. Controlled
Subsidies and I.R.C. 965, 33 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 107 (2010). There is
some debate on the success of this point, as the amount repatriated would have
generated $128 billion in tax revenue without the tax holiday. See also Pinson,
supra note 39, at 853. However, there is no indication that U.S. firms had any
intention of repatriating funds at the 35 percent rate, so it is difficult to accept the proposition that the Treasury lost money because of the holiday. Id.
45 Michael Mundaca, Just the Facts: The Costs of a Repatriation Tax Holiday,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY: TREASURY NOTES (Mar. 23, 2011), https://www
.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Just-the-Facts-The-Costs-of-a-Repatriation-Tax
-Holiday.aspx [http://perma.cc/Z2S2-SFR3].
46 Melissa Redmiles, The One-Time Received Dividend Deduction, 27 STAT.
INCOME BULL. 102, 103 (2008).
47 Floyd Norris, Tax Break for Profits Went Awry, N.Y. TIMES (June 4,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/05/business/05norris.html (“About 92
percent of it went to shareholders ....”).
48 Jennifer Blouin & Linda Krull, Bringing It Home: A Study of the Incentives Surrounding the Repatriation of Foreign Earnings Under the American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 1027, 1051 (2009).
49 Mundaca, supra note 45; Leder, supra note 42.
42
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companies actually cut jobs in fiscal years 2005 and 2006—even
though the U.S. economy as a whole added jobs in those years.50
Economist Martin Sullivan described the AJCA’s reinvestment plan requirements as a “ridiculous fig leaf” that accomplished
nothing: “If I’m going to give you $100 to buy lunch, ... but you
spend $500 a year anyway on lunch, you then bring back receipts
showing you bought $100 in lunch.”51 Corporations used repatriated funds as they promised, but this freed up funds that had
already been set aside for the same purpose.52 This allowed corporations to increase executive compensation, increase share buybacks,
and pay large dividends without violating the AJCA guidelines.53
Adding insult to Congressional injury, U.S. corporations
actually increased the amount of foreign earnings reinvested permanently overseas in both relative and absolute terms in the years
following the AJCA holiday.54 Furthermore, a study by the National
Bureau of Economic Research conducted several years after the
holiday closed concluded that 92 percent of the repatriated funds
were spent on dividends, share buybacks, or executive bonuses.55
The bureau’s report stated, “[r]epatriations did not lead to an increase in domestic investment, employment, or R.&D., even for the
firms that lobbied for the tax holiday stating these intentions.”56
III. IF AT FIRST YOU DON’T SUCCEED ...
Although the AJCA failed to meet government expectations,
and may have even harmed the U.S. economy, the idea of a tax
Mundaca, supra note 45.
Lynnley Browning, One-time tax break saved 843 U.S. corporations $265
billion, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/24/busi
ness/worldbusiness/24iht-24tax.13933715.html (internal quotations omitted).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Thomas J. Brennan, What Happens After a Holiday?: Long-Term Effects
of the Repatriation Provision of the AJCA, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y. 1, 16
(2010); Pinson, supra note 39, at 852.
55 Schwartz & Duhigg, supra note 19. A private study published in the
Journal of Finance demonstrated a statistically significant positive correlation
between increases in repatriations under the AJCA and “an increase of $.60 to
$.92 in payouts to shareholders, largely in the form of share repurchases.”
Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Watch What I Do, Not What I Say: The Unintended
Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act, 66 J. FIN. 753, 782 (2011).
56 Schwartz & Duhigg, supra note 19, at 2.
50
51
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holiday has refused to fade.57 Since the AJCA window closed in
2006, the idea of a tax holiday with different terms has resurfaced roughly every two to three years.58 Current proposals are
based on proposals for a tax holiday that began surfacing in 2011,
gained impetus in 2013, and were introduced in Congress in 2014
and 2015.59
A. Current Proposals in Congress
1. The Invest in Transportation Act
The Invest in Transportation Act (ITA) is evidence that
Congress learned the lessons of the AJCA.60 The Act, sponsored
by Senators Rand Paul and Barbara Boxer, allows corporations
to repatriate income, but with significant strings attached.61 Participating corporations may repatriate overseas income earned
prior to 2015 at an effective rate of 6.5 percent.62 Corporations
are required to establish a domestic reinvestment plan requiring
25 percent of all repatriated income to be invested in the U.S.
economy via increased hiring, wages, pension contributions, energy
efficiency, environmental and capital improvements, and research
and development.63 Tax revenues from repatriated earnings will
be directed towards infrastructure improvements, specifically highways, bridges, and green energy investments.64
The Invest in Transportation Act makes four significant
improvements on the AJCA framework.65 First, corporations will
Mundaca, supra note 45.
Id.
59 ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & APARNA MATHUR, NEW DEMOCRAT NETWORK, THE
REVENUE AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE PAUL-BOXER PLAN TO ENCOURAGE THE
REPATRIATION OF FOREIGN-SOURCE EARNINGS BY U.S. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, NDN 1 (2015).
60 Invest in Transportation Act, S. 981, 114th Cong. § 2(c) (2015).
61 Id. § 2(a)–(d).
62 Id. § 2(b).
63 Id. § 2(d)(ii).
64 Id.
65 Sens. Paul, Boxer Introduce Bipartisan “Invest in Transportation Act,”
RAND PAUL U.S. SENATOR FOR KENTUCKY (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.paul.sen
ate.gov/news/sens-paul-boxer-introduce-bipartisan-%E2%80%9Cinvest-trans
portation-act%E2%80%9D [https://perma.cc/667E-P9HH].
57
58
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not be permitted to use the repatriated funds for executive compensation.66 Second, the minimum domestic investment requirement is 25 percent rather than 15 percent.67 This investment
requirement is in addition to previously considered funding and
cannot supplant previously earmarked funds.68 Third, the ITA
forbids participating companies from inverting at any time in
the ten taxable-year period following the passage of the ITA.69
Companies that elect to invert will be taxed at 20 percent, with
interest, on all repatriated funds.70 Fourth, and most importantly,
Federal revenues are channeled directly into the Highway Trust
Fund coffers for investment.71 Companies have up to five years
to complete their repatriations, but must begin to do so in the
first year of the holiday window.72
Senator Boxer, like the various House Representatives
who championed the AJCA, is optimistic that the ITA will stimulate
both GDP and job growth.73 Citing various studies done on similar
repatriation proposals, Senator Boxer’s press release implied that
the ITA will increase GDP by between $178 and $400 billion and
provide an increase of between 1.3 and 3.5 million jobs.74
B. 2016 Presidential Candidates’ Proposals
Ms. Clinton and Mr. Trump agreed on very few things, but
both emphasized the need to reform America’s tax system during
their campaigns.75 Although Mr. Trump was the only candidate to
Id.
Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Testimony of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation: Hearing on
the Taxation of the Repatriation of Foreign Earnings, 114th Cong. 7–8 (2015)
(statement of Thomas A. Barthold, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4797 [http://
perma.cc/ZB24-PUMY].
72 Id. at 8–9.
73 Boxer-Paul “Invest in Transportation Act,” BARBARA BOXER U.S. SENATOR
FOR CALIFORNIA (Jan. 29, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20150212171417
/http://www.boxer.senate.gov/press/related/BoxerPaulWhitePaper012915.pdf.
74 See id.
75 See ERNST & YOUNG, TRUMP VS. CLINTON: POLICY PERSPECTIVES 2–7 (Aug.
2016), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-trump-vs-clinton-policy
66
67
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set forth a concrete written proposal, both acknowledged the
need to increase investment in the domestic economy while simultaneously decreasing corporate offshore cash holdings.76
1. Ms. Clinton’s Proposals
Ms. Clinton allegedly talked on several occasions about a
tax holiday, but did not provide any concrete written proposal.77
Her official tax plan stated that her administration would provide companies with “incentives” to repatriate funds.78 Additionally,
Ms. Clinton proposed $275 billion in infrastructure spending that
would be funded by “business tax reform.”79 Tax analyst Henrietta
Treyz believed that this is code for repatriations.80
Ms. Treyz’s belief was seemingly well supported by remarks given by the Clintons.81 Speaking to a CNBC reporter at
the Clinton Global Initiative Annual Meeting in September 2016,
Mr. Clinton stated that he supports a repatriation initiative that
requires investment in a national infrastructure program.82
WikiLeaks also released the transcripts of several paid speeches
given by Ms. Clinton in 2013 and 2014 to various corporate groups
-perspectives/%24FILE/ey-trump-vs-clinton-policy-perspectives.pdf [http://perma
.cc/E3HP-CXER].
76 Id.
77 Jon Schwarz, Hillary Clinton Hints at Giant, Trump-Like Giveaway to
Corporate America, INTERCEPT (June 27, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016
/06/27/hillary-clinton-hints-at-giant-trump-like-giveaway-to-corporate-america/
[http://perma.cc/YBY9-J6QP].
78 The Briefing: Factsheets, HILLARY CLINTON (2016), https://web.archive
.org/web/20170902125217/https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factsheets
/2015/12/08/ending-inversions-and-investing-in-america [http://perma.cc
/H9X3-FMLK].
79 Lynnley Browning, Trump’s Offshore Tax-Cut Pitch Falls Flat, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 24, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08
-24/trump-s-offshore-tax-cut-pitch-falls-flat-in-silicon-valley [http://perma.cc
/BS3P-JPE9].
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Tom DiChristopher, Bill Clinton supports lower corporate tax rate, says
reasoning for TPP clear, CNBC (Sep. 21, 2016, 8:04 AM), http://www.cnbc.com
/2016/09/21/bill-clinton-supports-lower-corporate-tax-rate-says-reasoning-for
-tpp-clear.html [http://perma.cc/8AM7-MFM9].
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in which she allegedly intimated that she was interested in a
“lower rate—a really low rate” for repatriations if participants
were willing to “invest a percentage in an infrastructure bank.”83
Although none of this is conclusive evidence of what a
Clinton administration would have pushed for, it seems reasonable to believe that Ms. Clinton’s repatriation plan would have
functioned in a similar fashion to the ITA.
2. President Trump’s Proposals
In contrast, President Trump proposed a one-time, nostrings-attached tax holiday with a 10 percent effective rate.84
President Trump briefly outlined this proposal in a speech delivered at the Economic Club of New York in September 2016.
[W]e will bring back trillions in business wealth parked overseas and tax it at a 10 [percent] rate. Some people say there are
$2 trillion dollars overseas, I think it’s $5 trillion. By taxing it at
10 [percent] instead of 35 [percent], all of this money will come
back into our country. We will turn America into a magnet for
new jobs—and that means jobs in our poorest communities. 85

Brianna Gurciullo, WikiLeaks: Clinton talked infrastructure in paid
speeches, POLITICO (Oct. 13, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets
/morning-transportation/2016/10/wikileaks-clinton-talked-infrastructure-in
-paid-speeches-216837 [http://perma.cc/Q3EP-AFY3].
84 Tax Plan, DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT (2016), https://web.archive
.org/web/20170208174336/https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/tax-plan/?
/positions/tax-reform [http://perma.cc/4SE2-VCEA]. The language of Mr. Trump’s
proposal is interesting, as it states that his administration “will provide a
deemed repatriation of corporate profits held offshore at a one-time tax rate of
10 percent.” Id. (emphasis added). Analysts have questioned whether only
repatriated funds will be taxed at this rate or all overseas cash holding will
be taxed. Yoni Heisler, How Donald Trump’s tax plan might save Apple billions
of dollars, BGR (Nov. 14, 2016, 5:24 PM), http://bgr.com/2016/11/14/donald
-trump-tax-plan-apple-overseas-cash-holiday/ [http://perma.cc/F6RC-HNRC].
85 Tessa Berenson, Republican Presidential Candidate Donald Trump,
Address at the Economic Club of New York, TIME (Sept. 15, 2016) (transcript
available at http://time.com/4495507/donald-trump-economy-speech-transcript/)
[http://perma.cc/68KD-7583]. In that same speech, Mr. Trump also stated
“[c]rumbling roads and bridges can become gleaming new infrastructure” and
promised that his administration “will also allow U.S.-based manufacturers
to fully expense the cost of new plants and equipment.” Id.
83
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Following his election, President Trump made a few additional statements reiterating this basic outline, but has not elucidated it further.86 Despite the lack of additional facts, industry
analysts became convinced that repatriated funds would be used
for infrastructure investment.87
This conclusion appears to be accurate. During the election
campaign, Wilbur Ross and Peter Navarro, two of the Trump campaign’s senior policy advisors, published a policy paper outlining
how repatriation can fund infrastructure investment.88 Under their
proposal, tax funds received from the 10 percent repatriation tax
would be spent directly on infrastructure.89 However, corporations
would also be given the opportunity to further offset their tax
liability by using the tax credit to invest in infrastructure equity.90
Participating corporations would therefore be making equity investments in infrastructure projects rather than paying taxes.91
The U.S. government would receive no tax revenue under this
scheme, but Ross and Navarro’s plan would deliver “more and
new infrastructure.”92
86 Leila Abboud & Brooke Sutherland, Trump and Taxes, BLOOMBERG:
GADFLY (Nov. 9, 2016, 12:32 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles
/2016-11-09/trump-corporate-tax-plan-may-deter-inverters-but-not-cash-hoards
[http://perma.cc/25AU-MGAQ].
87 Howard Gleckman, GOP Offering Democrats a Shell Game To Win Their
Support For A Tax Cut, FORBES: BUS. IN THE BELTWAY (Nov. 17, 2016, 2:34
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2016/11/17/a-tax-on-multinationals
-cant-pay-for-both-roads-and-tax-cuts/#bde4d3927dc8 [https://perma.cc/JL5Q
-ZYA6]; Laurence Arnold & Sho Chandra, How Trump Might Try to Fix Bridges
and Highways: QuickTake Q&A, BLOOMBERG: MKTS. (Nov. 14, 2016, 11:12
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-14/how-trump-might
-try-to-fix-bridges-and-highways-quicktake-q-a [http://perma.cc/4SMN-7SBS].
88 Wilbur Ross & Peter Navarro, Trump Versus Clinton on Infrastructure,
PETER NAVARRO (Oct. 27, 2016), http://peternavarro.com/sitebuildercontent
/sitebuilderfiles/infrastructurereport.pdf [http://perma.cc/TN2W-KKZ9]. Ross
and Navarro claim that every $200 billion in additional infrastructure expenditures increases the wages of “average Americans” by $88 billion and
“increases real GDP growth by more than a percentage point.” Id. at 2. They
further claim that “[e]ach GDP point creates 1.2 million additional jobs.” Id.
89 Id. at 5.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 5–6.
92 Id. at 6. Although not explicitly stated in the Ross and Navarro plan,
the fact that this proposed scheme allegedly functions without bureaucratic
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C. Industry Proposals
1. Apple, Inc.’s Proposal
Although many companies have called for a tax holiday,
Apple, Inc. has been among the most vocal.93 As America’s
self-styled “largest corporate tax payer,”94 Apple has repeatedly
called for a tax holiday on virtually the same terms as the
AJCA.95 Tim Cook, Apple’s CEO, believes that participating corporations will use repatriated funds for capital and labor investments this time because a high percentage of corporate liquidity
is tied up in offshore cash and the need for domestic investment
is high.96 Apple, like Pfizer, Proctor & Gamble, and other major
corporations that have lobbied for another tax holiday, has not
provided any studies detailing the benefits of such a holiday to
the American economy.97
oversight is a key theme throughout the paper. Donald Trump’s infrastructure
page on his campaign website goes to great lengths to point out the various ways
in which regulatory agencies have delayed or prevented infrastructure projects.
See Infrastructure, DONALD J. TRUMP (2016) (on file with author). Contra Tribune
News Services, Trump pushes infrastructure plans but congress blocked Obama
on issue, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 11, 2016, 8:17 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com
/news/nationworld/politics/ct-donald-trump-infrastructure-spending-20161111
-story.html [http://perma.cc/Z953-XPCS] (arguing that private-sector-led infrastructure investment focuses on projects with a guaranteed revenue stream
and overlooks the impoverished communities that stand to benefit most from
such investment).
93 Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple Inc.):
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm.
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 8 (2013).
94 Id.
95 Heidi Moore, Tim Cook’s pitch for a corporate tax holiday suits Washington just fine, GUARDIAN (May 17, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/com
mentisfree/2013/may/17/tim-cook-tax-holiday-suits-politicians [http://perma
.cc/TBE2-ZAQN].
96 Tim Higgins, Tim Cook’s $181 Billion Headache: Apple’s Cash Abroad,
BLOOMBERG: TECH. (July 22, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2015-07-22/tim-cook-s-181-billion-headache-apple-s-cash-held-overseas [http://
perma.cc/XJ2R-9BXJ].
97 This lack of transparency has led to no small amount of frustration
among tax reform advocates who see Apple’s calls as an assumption that what is
good for Apple is good for America. See Moore, supra note 95.
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2. Standard & Poor’s Proposal
In October 2016, Standard & Poor Global (S&P) proposed
that American companies should be allowed to repatriate funds
at a 0 percent (zero) tax rate if they invest 15 percent of the money
in certain U.S. infrastructure projects.98 S&P projects that, even
if companies only brought back half of the $2 trillion held overseas, then it would result in a $150 billion investment in infrastructure, create 307,000 infrastructure-related jobs, and add
$189.5 billion to the U.S. GDP through the multiplier effect
within the first several years.99
The S&P plan has the benefit of being very straightforward. Participating companies must commit to purchasing—and
holding—infrastructure bonds issued by the government100 within a certain period of time following repatriation.101 Importantly,
these infrastructure bonds will pay for “repair[ing] and refurbish[ing] the roads, bridges, water systems, and rail networks
that the American Society of Civil Engineers grades a ‘D+’”.102
Corporations that fail to purchase the bonds within the time
period will be forced to pay the full statutory rate plus penalties.103 After purchasing the bonds, participating corporations
may spend their repatriated funds however they please.104
98 Beth Ann Bovino et al., Rebuilding Through Repatriation: How Corporate Cash Can Save America’s Infrastructure, S&P GLOBAL (Oct. 5, 2016), https://
www.spglobal.com/our-insights/Rebuilding-Through-Repatriation-How-Corporate
-Cash-Can-Save-Americas-Infrastructure-.html [https://perma.cc/T8D2-A9EP].
99 Id. at 2. The multiplier effect is the well-understood economic phenomenon whereby a given input produces a larger output. See id. at 3 (explaining
the multiplier effect). A multiplier of 1.5x therefore indicates that every $1 of
investment will produce a $1.50 return.
100 S&P suggests state and local levels of government act as the bond issuers.
Id. at 6. This is unique among the surveyed proposals, all of which contemplate infrastructure projects initiated by federal agencies.
101 Id. at 6.
102 Id. at 2. This is especially important when calculating the multiplier effect, as multipliers tend to be higher in struggling economies. See id. Focusing on
projects in areas that struggle the most will therefore produce the highest
returns. See generally 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, AM. SOC’Y
CIV. ENGINEERS (2013), http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/ [https://perma
.cc/7KYG-GA89] (explaining the ASCE infrastructure grading system).
103 Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 6–7.
104 Id. at 7.
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S&P offers several well-reasoned arguments in support of
their proposal.105 First, S&P believes that corporations will be
enthusiastic to participate in this repatriation holiday.106 Although
corporate overseas cash holdings have continually increased, the
debt of the top fifteen U.S. corporations has grown even more
quickly.107 S&P suggests this means that many corporations have
exhausted their domestic cash flows and are instead financing
stock repurchases and dividends using debt.108 S&P believes
that corporations prefer repatriation and domestic investment to
debt and overseas cash and will therefore participate.109 Another
inspiring factor is the increasing willingness of supranational
tax authorities, such as the European Union Tax Commission, to
pursue these funds.110 Most importantly, corporations will be
making an investment rather than simply paying taxes.111 This
will induce corporations to participate and, in S&P’s words,
“save America’s infrastructure.”112
IV. A NEWER DEAL: PROJECTED POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
The AJCA’s failure to stimulate anything beyond shareholder buybacks means that proposals for another tax holiday
deserve strict scrutiny.113 Statistics may be a class of damned
lies, but any proposal that promises economic growth should be
judged primarily using a cost/benefit analysis.114 If a directed
Id. at 7–9.
See id. at 5, 9.
107 Id. at 5.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. See also David Kocieniewski & Lynnley Browning, Apple’s $14.5
Billion EU Bill May Press U.S. on Tax Overhaul, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30, 2016,
4:57 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-30/apple-s-14-5-bil
lion-eu-bill-may-pressure-u-s-on-tax-overhaul [https://perma.cc/2WED-K3XT]
(discussing U.S. multinationals whose taxes are currently being investigated
by the E.U.); Juliette Garside, War of words hots up between US and EU over
tax avoidance, GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2016, 1:36 PM), https://www.theguardian
.com/business/2016/aug/25/war-of-words-eu-us-tax-avoidance-starbucks-apple
-amazon [https://perma.cc/CL8P-287L] (presaging more active E.U. tax investigations into U.S. multinationals).
111 Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 6.
112 Id. at 9.
113 See MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 11, at 6.
114 See id. at 5.
105

106
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tax holiday will produce greater net economic benefits than perpetuating the status quo, then Congress should pursue such a
holiday.115 In this section, I set out the framework for determining the costs and benefits of each proposal and compare the
cost/benefit differential for each proposal.
A. The Cost of a Tax Holiday
Although each proposal involves differing sums and effective rates, the theoretical cost analysis for each proposal is identical.116 Under each proposal, a certain sum will be repatriated.117
Every company that would participate in a repatriation tax holiday
could hypothetically repatriate that same sum at the statutory
rate.118 The difference between these is the basic cost of the plan
to the Federal government.119 This basic cost figure is then modified
using the Government Purchases Multiplier (GPM) to determine
the cost of each proposal to the U.S. economy.120
For the purposes of this Note, I assume two things. First,
I assume that the Federal government would allocate the repatriation revenue (from corporations paying the statutory 35 percent
rate) evenly across government rather than concentrating it in a
single agency or department. Second, I assume that all revenue
will be spent on government purchases rather than on interest
payments or transfers. These assumptions enable the use of the
general multiplier for Federal purchases of goods and services.121
See id.
See id. at 1–2.
117 Denoted in the following equations as “Amount Repatriated.”
118 Government Revenue at Statutory Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x (Domestic Effective Rate). Domestic Effective Rate = (Domestic Statutory Rate –
Overseas Effective Rate). Note that this equation takes the fact that corporations
pay a certain percentage of their tax overseas into account. See MARPLES &
GRAVELLE, supra note 11, at 1–2.
119 Basic Cost = (Government Revenue at Statutory Rate) – (Government
Revenue at Tax Holiday Rate).
120 Cost to U.S. Economy = (Basic Cost) x (Government Purchases Multiplier).
121 The Government Purchases Multiplier (GPM) is one of several different
government spending multipliers that model the results of different types of
government spending. The GPM excludes interest payments and transfers
and examines government-wide spending. See generally Giancarlo Corsetti et
al., What Determines Government Spending Multipliers? (IMF Working Paper
(WP/12/150) (2012)), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12150.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NL3M-9QPP].
115

116
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Although the exact multiplier is debated—estimates range between 0.5x and 1.0x122—existing empirical studies support 0.9x
as an acceptably accurate figure for middle-of-the-road economic
situations such as that which currently exists.123
1. The ITA Proposal124
The New Democratic Network (NDN) estimates that U.S.
corporations would repatriate about $1.4 trillion under the
terms proposed by the ITA.125 If corporations pay an average 10
percent effective rate on their overseas earnings, that $1.4 trillion
would add $350 billion to Federal coffers if repatriated under
current tax rules.126 When modified by the GPM, that $350 billion would produce a $315 billion benefit to the U.S. economy.127
If corporations repatriate that same $1.4 trillion at a 6.5 percent
effective rate to foreign governments under the ITA, then Uncle
Sam nets a mere $91 billion in taxes.128 If this revenue was simply
spent on government purchases, then it would produce a benefit
to the U.S. economy of $81.9 billion.129 Thus, the ITA plan to
See Robert E. Hall, By How Much Does GDP Rise If the Government
Buys More Output?, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: FALL 2009 183,
195 (David H. Romer & Justin Wolfers eds., 2009) (reviewing the empirical
studies on the effects of government defense purchases). Hall also raises the
interesting proposition that the GDP multiplier may go as high as 1.7x “when
monetary policy becomes passive with a zero nominal interest rate.” Id. at
187. See generally Corsetti et al., supra note 121.
123 Hall, supra note 122, at 195; Robert J. Barro & Charles J. Redlick, Macroeconomic Effects From Government Purchases and Taxes, 126 Q.J. ECON. 51,
72 (2011); Giovanni Ganelli & Juha Tervala, The Welfare Multiplier of Public
Infrastructure Investment (IMF Working Paper (WP/16/40) (2015)); Valerie A.
Ramey, Can Government Purchases Stimulate the Economy?, 49 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 673, 675 (2011).
124 The analysis for the ITA proposal can be extended to the Clinton proposal given the similarities between the two. See supra Section III.B.1.
125 SHAPIRO & MATHUR, supra note 59, at 36.
126 Government Revenue at Statutory Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x
(Domestic Effective Rate) = ($1.4 trillion) x (0.35 – 0.10) = $350 billion.
127 Benefit to U.S. Economy = (Government Revenue at Statutory Rate) x
(Government Purchases Multiplier) = ($350 billion) x (0.9) = $315 billion.
128 Government Revenue at Holiday Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x (Holiday Rate) = ($1.4 trillion) x (0.065) = $91 billion.
129 Benefit to U.S. Economy = (Government Revenue at Holiday Rate) x
(GPM) = ($91 billion) x (0.9) = $81.9 billion.
122
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repatriate funds at a reduced rate and invest them must add at
least $233.1 billion worth of but-for growth to the U.S. economy
to justify a tax holiday.130
2. S&P Global
This calculation is somewhat easier for the Standard &
Poor proposal. S&P is less optimistic than the NDN on the
amount that will be repatriated and estimates that only about
$1 trillion of all overseas funds would be repatriated during a
tax-free (0 percent effective rate) holiday.131 Assuming this figure is correct, and corporations already pay a 10 percent rate to
foreign governments, then the Federal government would be
giving up $250 billion of revenue.132 When modified by the GPM,
the net cost to the U.S. economy is $233.1 billion and the S&P
plan must better that figure to produce a net benefit.133
3. President Trump’s Proposal
President Trump’s repatriation proposal is the most simplistic. He has stated that there is somewhere between $2 and
$5 trillion stashed overseas and that a 10 percent rate will induce corporations to bring their entire overseas cash home.134
President Trump’s upper-bound estimate of $5 trillion is wildly
out of line with industry analyses,135 so I will use $2 trillion as
130 Break-Even Amount = (Benefit to U.S. Economy at Statutory Rate) –
(Benefit to U.S. Economy at Holiday Rate) = ($315 billion) – ($81.9 billion) =
$233.1 billion. Note that this is but-for growth; the total amount that the ITA
plan would need to generate to produce a net benefit to the U.S. economy
remains $315 billion.
131 See Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 2.
132 Government Revenue at Statutory Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x
(Domestic Effective Rate) = ($1 trillion) x (0.35 – 0.10) = $250 billion. Government Revenue at Holiday Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x (Holiday Rate) =
($1 trillion) x (0.0) = $0.
133 Benefit to U.S. Economy at Statutory Rate = (Government Revenue at
Statutory Rate) x (GPM) = ($250 billion) x (0.9) = $233.1 billion.
134 Tax Plan, supra note 84.
135 Compare Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 3 (stating that U.S. corporations hold more than $2 trillion overseas), and CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE,
supra note 4, at 2 (stating that U.S. corporations hold about $2.4 trillion
overseas), with Berenson, supra note 85.
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the total sum to be repatriated. $2 trillion repatriated at the
statutory rate generates $500 billion in revenue for the Treasury
and $450 billion of economic benefit to the United States.136 A
10 percent holiday rate would reduce the Treasury’s revenue to
$200 billion and,137 if the Federal government spent the revenue
on purchases, produce an economic benefit of $180 billion.138
President Trump’s plan must therefore generate a massive $270
billion worth of but-for growth to simply break even.139
4. Summary
The basic revenues and benefits of the plans are summarized below in Figure 1.

Revenue
at Holiday
Rate

Benefit to
U.S.
Economy at
Statutory
Rate

Plan

Amount
Repatriated

Holiday
Rate

Revenue
at
Statutory
Rate

ITA

$1.4 trillion

6.5%

$350 billion

$91 billion

$315 billion

S&P

$1 trillion

0% (15%)

$250 billion

$0

$233.1 billion

Trump

$2 trillion

10%

$500 billion

$200 billion

$450 billion

Figure 1: Basic Revenues and Benefits
Government Revenue at Statutory Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x
(Domestic Effective Rate) = ($2 trillion) x (0.35 – 0.10) = $500 billion. Benefit
to U.S. Economy = (Government Revenue at Statutory Rate) x (GPM) = ($500
billion) x (0.90) = $450 billion.
137 Government Revenue at Holiday Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x (Holiday
Rate) = ($2 trillion) x (0.10) = $200 billion.
138 Government Revenue at Holiday Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x (Holiday
Rate) = ($2 trillion) x (0.10) = $200 billion.
139 Break-Even Amount = (Benefit to U.S. Economy at Statutory Rate) – (Benefit to U.S. Economy at Holiday Rate) = ($450 billion – $180 billion) = $270
billion. Once again, the purpose of this figure is to illustrate how much more
lucrative infrastructure investment must be to justify a tax holiday.
136
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B. The Benefits of Infrastructure Investment
Calculating the benefits of each plan is somewhat more
difficult because the benefits of infrastructure investment fluctuate significantly based on existing economic conditions.140
1. Precedent: The New Deal and Interstate Creation Act
America has a long, well-documented history of successfully reinvigorating the domestic economy via infrastructure
investment.141 In 1933, at the height of the Great Depression,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced a New Deal for
Americans.142 As part of this New Deal, the Federal government
invested huge sums into public works projects such as highways,
bridges, and dams.143 Notably, many of these projects are still
providing significant benefits to the U.S. economy.144 Massive
investment in highways under the Eisenhower Administration
further boosted the U.S. economy and provided a framework around
which the U.S. enjoyed an unprecedented period of growth and
prosperity.145 Notably, the benefits of transportation infrastructure investment are not limited to new projects and may even be
greater when investment is directed towards “plain old maintenance” and upgrading existing infrastructure such as highways.146
See Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 3–4.
For a technical analysis of the economic benefits associated with public
infrastructure expenditure in 20th century America, see David Alan Aschauer,
Is Public Expenditure Productive?, 23 J. MONETARY ECON. 177 (1989). See generally Adam J. White, Infrastructure Policy: Lessons from American History, 35
NEW ATLANTIS 3 (2012) (reciting America’s lucrative history of large-scale
investment in infrastructure).
142 White, supra note 141, at 3.
143 Id. at 3, 24.
144 THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT (Oct. 11, 2010), https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/infrastructure
_investment_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/39UD-JJJP].
145 Edward M. Gramlich, Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay, 32 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1176, 1178 (1993).
146 Id. at 1184. Gramlich demonstrates a historic 35 percent lifetime return on investment from projects maintaining existing highway conditions
from 1948–90. Id.
140

141
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2. Think Tank Thoughts: EPI and IRENA
Infrastructure as stimulus is just as valid today as it was
in the 1930s and 1950s.147 A 2014 study of different infrastructure investment proposals conducted by Washington-based think
tank Economic Policy Institute (EPI) estimated an average 1.6x
multiplier based on data from the Congressional Budget Office,
Council of Economic Advisors, and Moody’s Analytics.148 The
study examined infrastructure spending on green building technologies and utilities149 in addition to highways and bridges,
transportation systems and water systems.150
Investment in green technology such as renewable energy
plants and “green cities” is a new, but reliable, form of economic
stimulus.151 A 2016 report from the International Renewable
Energy Agency, an Abu Dhabi–based think tank, found that
doubling investment in renewables in the United States would
result in a $110–150 billion GDP boost152 and create more than
a million permanent new jobs over the next decade.153

Josh Bivens, The Short- and Long-Term Impact of Infrastructure Investments on Employment and Economic Activity in the U.S. Economy 47 (2014)
(Econ. Pol’y Inst. Briefing Paper 347), http://www.epi.org/files/2014/impact-of
-infrastructure-investments.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5NB-JNMV].
148 Id. at 21.
149 Id. at 13–14. EPI found that green technologies were a particularly good
investment, yielding a multiplier of between 2.8x and 6.0x based on the economic conditions of the areas of the projects. See generally S. Pacala & R.
Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50
Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCI. 968, 968–72 (2004).
150 Bivens, supra note 147, at 15–17.
151 Rabia Ferroukhi et al., Renewable Energy Benefits: Measuring the Economics, IRENA 27–28 (2016), http://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency
/Publication/2016/IRENA_Measuring-the-Economics_2016.pdf [https://perma
.cc/PLZ8-6PVS].
152 Id. at 25. In 2015 the U.S. public and private sectors invested a $44 billion into renewable energy projects. Rebecca Harrington, The US is actually
leading the way on clean energy, BUS. INSIDER (May 6, 2016, 12:06 PM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/us-2015-renewable-energy-investments-2016-5 [https://
perma.cc/5LGW-ETWV].
153 Ferroukhi et al., supra note 151, at 41.
147
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3. Industry Analysis: S&P Global & Moody’s Analytics
Standard & Poor projects that a $150 billion investment
in infrastructure will create 307,000 infrastructure-related jobs
and add $189.5 billion to the U.S. GDP through the multiplier
effect within the first several years.154 S&P estimates that this
multiplier would average around 1.3x, but could be as high as
1.7x in the correct conditions.155
Moody’s Analytics is somewhat more optimistic than S&P
and estimates a 1.78x multiplier for stable periods of time in the
business cycle.156
4. Summary and Application
This evidence demonstrates that we may safely assume a
multiplier somewhere in the 1.3x to 1.8x range given that relative stability of the U.S. economy at the present.157 In Figure 2,
below, I present each proposal and its potential benefits under
each multiplier from the range, rounded to the nearest tenth. The

Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 4.
Id. at 3–4. The reason for this variation is differing economic conditions; a
strong economy will produce a lower multiplier while a stagnant or struggling
economy will produce a greater multiplier. Id. The upper-bound estimate is
interesting because it is equal to Robert Hall’s calculation for the federal
purchases multiplier in economies with a zero nominal interest rate. See
Hall, supra note 122, at 187. This raises the argument that it does not matter
whether the federal government purchases goods and services or invests in
infrastructure because the benefit to the domestic economy will essentially be
the same. While this argument may have some merit, Hall’s calculation is based
on a ten-year model and it seems highly unlikely that the Federal Reserve
will allow rates to remain around zero for that long. See David Harrison, Fed
Minutes Show Officials Expect to Raise Rates ‘Relatively Soon,’ WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-minutes-show-officials-expect
-to-raise-rates-relatively-soon-1476295562.
156 Dan White & Sarah Crane, U.S. Infrastructure Funding Needs More
Than a Quick Fix, MOODY’S ANALYTICS (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.economy
.com/dismal/analysis/free/254109 [https://perma.cc/X7HW-9UWX].
157 See, e.g., Kimberly Amadeo, US Economic Outlook: For 2018 and Beyond,
BALANCE (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/us-economic-outlook-330
5669 [https://perma.cc/P8DR-WV56].
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benefit to the U.S. economy at statutory rate figure generated in
the preceding section on cost is presented as the “Break-Even”
figure here for comparison purposes.158
BreakEven

Infrastructure Multiplier
1.3x

1.4x

1.5x

1.6x

1.7x

1.8x

ITA

$315
billion

$118.3
billion

$127.4
billion

$136.5
billion

$145.6
billion

$154.7
billion

$163.8
billion

S&P

$233.1
billion

$195
billion

$210
billion

$225
billion

$240
billion

$255
billion

$270
billion

Trump

$450
billion

$260
billion

$280
billion

$300
billion

$320
billion

$340
billion

$360
billion

Figure 2: Benefits of Infrastructure Investment

There are several notable takeaways from this chart. First,
only the S&P plan produces a net economic benefit. Second, the
ITA and President Trump proposals not only fail to break even,
but produce substantial losses even at the highest multiplier.159
These results look like damning evidence that a directed tax holiday will likely be a bad deal for the American economy. If this is
the case, then why is a tax holiday is even being contemplated?
V. BALANCING UTILITIES
At this point, it is appropriate to review the arguments
against a tax holiday and consider several rebuttals.
A. Arguments Against a Directed Tax Holiday
The argument against a tax holiday is comprised of three
basic ideas: tax holidays only benefit corporations, tax holidays
encourage bad behavior, and tax holidays are unnecessary.
158
159

See supra Section IV.A.4.
See supra Figure 2.
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1. Tax Holidays Only Benefit Corporations
The most common argument against tax holidays is that
they only benefit corporations.160 Looking to the AJCA, opponents
of tax holidays argue that another tax holiday will produce the
same results.161 The Federal government will lose revenue,162
corporations will issue large dividends to shareholders,163 and
the promised new jobs will not be created.164 Corporate America
will benefit while the rest of the country is worse off.165
This argument is also extended to proposed directed tax
holidays such as the ITA. Critics perform a cost-benefit analysis,
reach results similar to those presented in Figure 2, and conclude that the U.S. economy will lose money on a tax holiday.166
2. Tax Holidays Encourage Bad Behavior
There is also some evidence to suggest that tax holidays
condition U.S. corporations to avoid paying domestic taxes by
keeping money overseas.167 After the 2004 tax holiday, U.S. corporations increased the percentage of foreign earnings held
overseas.168 This suggests that another tax holiday will only
encourage U.S. corporations to keep even more foreign earnings
overseas in anticipation of a third tax holiday—a classic case of
corporate Pavlovian conditioning.169
See, e.g., Kristina Peterson, Report: Repatriation Tax Holiday a ‘Failed’
Policy, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2011, 9:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424052970203633104576623771022129888.
161 CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, supra note 4.
162 Id.
163 See, e.g., Robin Wigglesworth, Where will corporate America’s overseas
cash pile go?, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/ee554c60
-b6ed-11e6-961e-a1acd97f622d.
164 See Mundaca, supra note 45.
165 See Schwartz & Duhigg, supra note 19.
166 See Richard Rubin, Repatriation Tax Break from Paul Boxer Would Cost
$118 Billion, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 30, 2015, 6:07 PM), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2015-04-30/repatriation-tax-break-from-paul-boxer-would
-cost-118-billion [https://perma.cc/9FZ5-LRBL].
167 Brennan, supra note 54, at 4.
168 Id. at 7–8.
169 Id. at 16–17.
160
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A corollary to this is the morality argument that another tax
holiday is wrong because it is simply pandering to corporations.170
3. Tax Holidays Are Unnecessary
The argument that tax holidays are unnecessary is a response to CEOs’ claims that their companies’ domestic operations
are suffering from a lack of capital because their cash is trapped
overseas.171 The cash is not “trapped” overseas by any sinister
government machinations; rather, U.S. corporations are leaving
their overseas cash in the hands of their foreign subsidiaries
because boards of directors are making a business decision not
to repatriate the funds.172 The United States therefore does not
need to take legislative action because boards of directors will
decide to repatriate overseas earnings when repatriation becomes
a prudent business decision.173 The argument that a tax holiday
is unnecessary is further supported by the shifting international
tax environment; which may soon force U.S multinationals to
repatriate their funds at the statutory rate.174 The recent E.U.
ruling that Apple Inc.’s tax arrangement with Ireland is illegal
sent shock waves through the international tax community and
inspired predictions that preferential tax situations around the
world will be scrutinized closely in the coming months.175

Chris Sanchirico, A Repatriation Tax Holiday for US Multinationals?
Four Contagious Illusions, TAX POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Dec. 10, 2014), http://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/repatriation-tax-holiday-us-multinationals-four
-contagious-illusions [https://perma.cc/VU3Z-UZB2]. How pandering is any different from Congress’s normal activities is an entirely different issue.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 The Global Tax Environment in 2016 and Implications for International Tax Reform: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways and Means U.S. House of
Representatives, 114th Cong. 3 (2016) (testimony of Edward Kleinbard, former Chief of Staff of the Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation).
175 Simon Bowers, Europe, Apple, and the money burning a hole in Silicon
Valley’s wallet, GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.theguardian
.com/business/2016/sep/03/ireland-apple-silicon-valley-money-burning-hole-wal
let [https://perma.cc/W4HB-395D].
170
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B. Realities that Support a Directed Tax Holiday
Careful consideration of the various proposals for a tax
holiday and the arguments against them leads to the conclusion
that there is no perfect tax holiday solution. There may not even
be an ideal solution. Critics of tax holidays make well-reasoned
arguments and have valid concerns. However, there are several
realities that support a directed tax holiday with revenues invested
directly into infrastructure.
1. Any Benefit from a Tax Holiday Is a Windfall Benefit
First and foremost, it is essential to recognize that any
benefit from a tax holiday is a windfall benefit.176 Corporations
have trillions of dollars overseas because they have refused to
repatriate those funds under the current statutory rate.177 Thus,
any benefit added to the U.S. economy because of a tax holiday
is but-for growth!178 The Federal government cannot lose revenue because it has realized no tax revenue from overseas corporate
cash.179 This reality is reflected in the fact that the Joint Committee
on Taxation, Congress’s budget scorekeepers, analyzes revenue
produced by a repatriation tax holiday as new revenue.180
Understanding and accepting this reality completely changes
the supposedly damning results presented in Figure 2. Reproduced below is Figure 3 showing the results of Figure 2, with a
modification to the break-even figure that reflects the economic
reality of repatriated funds.
176 Presentation of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation: Public
Hearing on Present Law and Selected Proposals Related to the Repatriation of
Foreign Earnings Before the Select Revenue Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Ways
and Means, 114th Cong. 15–18 (2015) [hereinafter Hearing on Repatriation of
Foreign Earnings].
177 Apple, Inc. CEO Tim Cook has been very candid about the fact that
Apple will not repatriate any meaningful sum of money until there are meaningful corporate tax reforms. Jena McGregor, Tim Cook, the interview: Running
Apple “is sort of a lonely job,” WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2016), http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/sf/business/2016/08/13/tim-cook-the-interview-running-apple
-is-sort-of-a-lonely-job/?tid=a_inl [https://perma.cc/M8RH-RVXE].
178 Hearing on Repatriation of Foreign Earnings, supra note 176, at 15–18.
179 Id.
180 Id.
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Infrastructure Multiplier
1.3x

1.4x

1.5x

1.6x

1.7x

1.8x

ITA

$0

$118.3
billion

$127.4
billion

$136.5
billion

$145.6
billion

$154.7
billion

$163.8
billion

S&P

$0

$195
billion

$210
billion

$225
billion

$240
billion

$255
billion

$270
billion

Trump

$0

$260
billion

$280
billion

$300
billion

$320
billion

$340
billion

$360
billion

Figure 3: Tax Holiday Benefits as Windfall Benefits

Thus, a directed tax holiday that funnels money directly
into infrastructure investments is not just a good deal for the
U.S. economy, it is practically impossible to turn down.
2. America Wants Infrastructure Investment
The American voting public made it clear in 2016 that domestic job growth and infrastructure development are major concerns.181 A directed tax holiday that channels revenues directly
into building infrastructure and repairing old infrastructure will
create new jobs and better cities.182 There is also an intangible
morale boost that comes from new infrastructure, particularly green
infrastructure.183 New projects create a sense of hope and optimism184—feelings that are especially needed in the decaying urban
areas that would benefit most from these infrastructure projects.
3. The Timing Is Right
The international tax environment at present is hostile to
U.S. corporations, suggesting that a tax holiday will likely be
Ben Casselman, Stop Saying Trump’s Win Had Nothing To Do With
Economics, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 9, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com
/features/stop-saying-trumps-win-had-nothing-to-do-with-economics/ [https://
perma.cc/N9BV-PNLB].
182 See Bovino et al., supra note 98.
183 See Ferroukhi et al., supra note 151, at 31–37.
184 Id. at 36–37.
181
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well-received.185 The recent E.U. court ruling that Ireland had
unfairly shielded Apple from paying corporate taxes has made
U.S. multinationals uncomfortable leaving large sums of money
overseas.186 Thus, a tax holiday would likely be better subscribed
to than the AJCA was.187 Furthermore, U.S. corporations are currently trapped in a moribund domestic economy and are under
increasing pressure from shareholders to reinvest in their underlying business, and in research and development.188 These factors suggest that the timing is right for a tax holiday.
4. The Moral High Ground Is Relatively Low
The moral concerns of pandering to corporations pale in
comparison to the tangible economic good that can be done with
billions of dollars in infrastructure investment.189 Yes, corporations should just pay their taxes like everyone else does. But
U.S. multinationals will continue to leave their money overseas
in increasingly well-hidden places because the statutory rate is,
in the words of Tim Cook, “absolutely crazy.”190 Standing firm on
the statutory rate may eventually result in corporations caving
in and bringing their money back to the United States, but this
result could take years to achieve and America’s infrastructure
needs are urgent.191 It seems better to be realistic about what
the moral high ground will actually buy—and the answer is not
new roads, green energy, or urban regeneration.
CONCLUSION
U.S. corporate tax law is long overdue for a reform—there
is very little genuine debate on this point. However, comprehensive
See Bowers, supra 175.
Id.
187 Id.
188 Eric Platt, US Companies’ cash pile hits $1.7tn, FIN. TIMES (May 20,
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/368ef430-1e24-11e6-a7bc-ee846770ec15.
189 See Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 2.
190 Dylan Tweney, Tim Cook says U.S. tax code is ‘absolutely crazy,’ VENTURE
BEAT (May 28, 2013, 8:24 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2013/05/28/tim-cook-says
-u-s-tax-code-is-absolutely-crazy/ [https://perma.cc/VA46-J9UW].
191 See Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 2.
185
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reform of any variety takes time and bipartisan cooperation—
qualities that are in short supply in Washington. A tax holiday
is not a lasting solution and there are significant dangers to
repeating a plan that was only ever meant to be a one-time occurrence. There is a real possibility that American multinationals
will develop Pavlovian tendencies and simply stash even more
cash overseas in hope of another holiday in the future. Comprehensive reform is the only way to fully resolve these concerns.
Nevertheless, the evidence seems to suggest that a directed
tax holiday is a good idea. Economic practicalities suggest that a
directed tax holiday would significantly benefit the U.S. economy.
The current international tax hostility towards American multinationals suggests that U.S. corporations may be looking for a
new place to park their cash. U.S. corporate debts and domestic
stagnation suggest that the United States is a prime candidate
for investment. History suggests that real, lasting economic
growth follows infrastructure investment and the American
people recently elected a President who promised to “Make
America Great Again.”192 A directed tax holiday channeled into
infrastructure investment is a relatively simple way to do that.

192

President Donald J. Trump, The Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2017).

